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McCrackin: Miscellaneous

MISCELLANEOUS
E. WINDELL MCCRACKIN*
Various types of eases are presented this year under this
section of the Survey. Although the name of the section implies insignificance, several of the cases will be of interest
to the profession.
Labor Relations
In Piedmont Shirt Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers
of America, AFL-CIO,1 the Taft-Hartley Act 2 was held to
have pre-empted the tortious acts complained of from being
heard in a state court. No allegations of violence or intimidation were involved so that the acts complained of could
legitimately be argued as being within Sections 7 and 8 of
said Act. Our Court accordingly affirmed the trial court's
decision dismissing the action.
A cause of action based on the South Carolina Right to
Work Law3 for damages resulting from alleged unlawful acts
of the defendants was upheld in Branham v. Miller Elec. Co. 4
The trial court had sustained a demurrer to the complaint for
insufficiency on the ground that plaintiff had failed to allege
that he was discharged by the defendant by reason of either
membership or non-membership in the union. This was reversed by the Supreme Court which stated through Mr. Justice Legge:
Here, the first section of the statute expressly declares it to be the public policy of this state that the right
of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on
account of membership or non-membership in a labor
union. But viewing that section in conjunction with the
others before mentioned, particularly Section 2, it seems
to us quite clear that the evils to which the legislative
intent and the remedial purpose of the statute were directed were: (1) union control of employment on the one
*Attorney at Law, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina.
1. 237 S. C. 13, 115 S. E. 2d 499 (1960).
2. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 157-158.
3. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 40-46 to-46.11 (Supp. 1960).
All references to Code sections are to this Code.
4. 237 S. C. 540, 118 S. E. 2d 167 (1961).
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hand; and (2) employer boycott of, or insistence upon,
union labor on the other. To hold that the prohibition
was directed exclusively against requirement of union
membership or non-membership as a condition of employment would be to disregard the prohibition, in Section 2, against agreements whereby the union acquires
an employment monopoly, and to permit frustration of
the legislative purpose by agreements such as the complaint here alleges, conditioning employment upon union
referral or approval.
So far as the applicability of our statute is concerned,
we can perceive no sound distinction between an agreement to hire only through the union and one to hire only
such persons as have been cleared through or referred
or approved by it. In either case it would be certain,
as a practical matter, that only union members in good
standing would be employed. In either case the 'employment monopoly' forbidden by Section 2 of our statute would be assured.
Condemnation
The State Highway Department, through eminent domain,
can condemn for its use property which was hitherto dedicated to a public use. This was the holding in Riley v. South
Carolina Highway Dept.5 Justice Oxner distinguished this
case from Commissioners v. Holliday6 by holding that the
State itself was in reality the condemnor here whereas the
County of Clarendon, a political subdivision of the State, was
the condemnor in the earlier case. The Court went further
and held that the statutes giving the highway department
authority to condemn were broad enough to imply full condemnation authority so that property already dedicated to
the public could be taken through condemnation.
In a condemnation case,7 our Court held that a charge by
the trial judge that " . .the property owner cannot be allowed to make a profit at public expense" was an improper
charge to the jury. The question before the jury was "what
was the 'just compensation' for the land taken," and whether
5. 238 S. C. 19, 118 S. E. 2d 809 (1961).
6. 182 S. C. 510, 189 S. E. 885 (1937).
7. Johnson v. South Carolina Highway Dept., 236 S. C. 424, 114 S. E.
2d 591 (1960).
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the owner made a profit on the land by reason of condemnation was not in issue. This statement can hardly be questioned.
"Is the State Highway Department exempt from liability
for compensation where in the course of construction or improving a state highway within a municipality, it takes private property for public use?" This was answered in the
negative by both the trial court and the Supreme Court in

8
Moseley v. South CarolinaHighway Dept.

The department contended that Section 33-112 relieved it of
liability for all damages "to property or persons resulting
from improvements, construction, reconstruction, or alteration carried out in accordance with the plans approved by the
said municipality." The Court pointed out, however, that
Article 1, Section 17, of the Constitution prohibiting the taking of private property for public use, was self executing
and could not be abridged by legislation. Further, the Court
held that Section 33-173 and 33-174 did not relieve the Highway Department from liability but that compensation for
taking private property for public use fell within the liability imposed upon municipalities by the foregoing code sections. The net effect of the statutes was to fix the liability
for any such damages as between two agencies of the sovereign, namely, the Highway Department and a municipality.
Attachment of Automobile
The Court held in Gunn v. Burnette9 that a wrecker being
used to hoist another vehicle by contractural agreement to
change the tires thereon, is not being operated as a motor vehicle within the purview of Section 45-551. It followed that
an attachment based on such circumstances was improper,
and was dissolved by the Court.
Attorney's Contract
It was contended in Ex parte Rankin v. SuperiorAuto. Ins.
Co.10 that an attorney's contract with an insured was binding
on the insurer-subrogee, so that the percentage contingency
fee applied to the amount subrogated. The Court held that
8. 236 S. C. 499, 115 S. E. 2d 172 (1960).
9. 236 S. C. 496, 115 S. E. 2d 171 (1960).
10. 237 S. C. 380, 117 S. E. 2d 525 (1960).
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the facts did not give rise to either an express or implied contract, and that the most that could be said was that the services rendered by petitioner Rankin incidentally benefited
the subrogee. Such, however, does not give rise to a contract.
DisciplinaryAction by Bar
The Supreme Court had disciplinary matters before it in
Burns v. Clayton." Voluminous testimony was taken in the
cases, but it is unnecessary to restate the facts here. Suffice
it to say that the facts as found by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline and the Supreme Court
were sufficient to justify the punitive measures taken, viz.,
indefinite suspension of one attorney and a public reprimand
for the other.
It should be said that the South Carolina Bar Association
and the Supreme Court have and are taking steps to police
the improper activities of the members of the South Carolina
Bar. This action is gratifying to the Bar and the public alike.
This is the way the profession can regain and increase its
prestige with the public.
Appointment of Committee
The unambiguous language of Section 32-990.2 was given
effect in In re Estate of Garrie S. Cogdell,12 wherein the
Court reversed the trial court's order appointing a committee
because the order was based on a report of the examiners
made before their appointment. The late Chief Justice Stukes
stated:
It is noted that the provisions in Sec. 32-990.2 for mental examination is prospective in nature and does not contemplate a certificate of the examiners based upon a former examination. (The order conformed, but the examination and certificate did not.) The wisdom of that is
manifest; it is within common knowledge that a person
may be normal mentally at one time, and not at another.
(It is the opinion of some experts that no one is perfectly
normal mentally, that all are abnormal in more or less
degree.)
11. 237 S. C. 316, 117 S. E. 2d 300 (1960).
12. 236 S. C. 404, 114 S. E. 2d 562 (1960).
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Foreign Judgments
Hamilton v. PattersonI3 involved a suit on a judgment rendered in the State of Florida. An answer was filed in the
Florida suit so that there was no question as to the Court's
jurisdiction of the parties. The case here was for the amount
of the deficiency judgment of the Florida court. The answer
here denied the validity of the Florida judgment, and attempted to allege fraud in the sale out of which the judgment
arose. The plaintiff moved to strike these and other defenses
on the ground that the answer was irrelevant, sham and frivolous and not constituting a defense to the cause of action.
The trial court granted this motion and gave judgment on
the pleadings.
After stating that it was presumed that the Florida court
had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties to the
action, and that the answer contained nothing to rebut the
presumption the Court stated:
...The attack now made upon the judgment goes only
to the merits of the case tried in Florida. Where a judgment rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the cause
and the parties is challenged in another State, 'the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution precludes any
inquiry into the merits of the cause of action, the logic or
consistency of the decision, or the validity of the legal
principles on which the judgment is based.' Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 Sup. Ct. 339, 342, 85. L.Ed. 278.
The Court then held that the defenses now attempted to be
asserted could have been set up in the answer in the Florida
court.
Public Schools
The dismissal of a high school principal was sought in
Stanley v. Gary14 for dismissing several children, including
one of the plaintiffs, from school. The action of the principal
apparently was brought on by reason of a boycott of certain
milk served in the school cafeteria. However, nothing was alleged as having been wrong with said milk.
A demurrer was interposed by defendants based on several
grounds, one of which was that the "complaint fails to state
13. 236 S. C. 487, 115 S. E. 2d 68 (1960).
14. 237 S. C. 237, 116 S.E. 2d 843 (1960).
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a cause of action in that it shows on its face that the appellants have not exhausted available administrative procedures
by an appeal to the school trustees and to the County Board
of Education." The demurrer was sustained on this ground
by the trial court.
On appeal the Court held that whether Gary should be continued as supervising principal of Mayo High School was
within the provision "matter of local controversy" as provided for in Section 21-247. Therefore, the plaintiffs had not
followed the procedures available to them as required by law,
viz., appeal to the County Board of Education from a decision
of the board of trustees of any school district.
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